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A Criticism of Kripke’s Semantic 
for Intuitionistic Logic 
Uma crítica à semântica de Kripke 
para a lógica intuicionista
Resumo
Nesta breve nota, pretendemos examinar criticamente a semântica de Kripke
para a lógica proposicional intuicionista. A semântica de Kripke é
extensionalmente correta com relação à lógica proposicional intuicionista, isto
é, o cálculo é correto e completo com respeito à semântica. O fragmento da
lógica proposicional intuicionista contendo a disjunção e a implicação também
é correto e completo com respeito às respectivas cláusulas semânticas.
Entretanto, como procuraremos argumentar, a semântica de Kripke é
intensionalmente enganadora, dado que a cláusula semântica de Kripke para a
implicação é intensionalmente enganadora. Tal problema pode ser
exemplificado quando consideramos o fragmento com disjunção e implicação.
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Abstract
This note aims to examine critically Kripke’s semantics for propositional
intuitionistic logic. Kripke’s semantic is extensionally correct with respect to
propositional intuitionistic logic, that is, the calculus is sound and complete with
respect to the semantics. The fragment of propositional intuitionist logic
containing disjunction and implication is also sound and complete with respect
to the respective semantical clauses. However, we´ll argue, Kripke semantics is
intensionally misleading, since Kripke’s semantical implication clause is
intensionally misleading. And the problem can be exemplified when we consider
the fragment with disjunction and implication.
Keywords: intuitionistic semantics; hypotheses; propositional logic.
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1. Introduction
Kripke’s semantic for intuitionistic logic came out in the 60’s of the 20th
century, see [Kri65]. Since then it has been regarded as one of the main
semantical analyses of intuitionistic logic, if not from a philosophical point of
view, at least from a practical point of view. It has been object of exposition in
many different places, as in [Fit69].
However, other analyses have been proposed, notably those called proof-
theoretical analyses. For a discussion concerning proof-theoretical definitions of
validity and the problem of completeness see [Sch12], [Pie15] and [San16]. It is
noteworthy that the problem we are going to expose seems to remain largely
unnoticed in proof-theoretic semantics.
2. Intuitionistic Sequent Calculus
We will focus on the propositional fragment of intuitionistic logic containing
implication and disjunction. Our considerations will be based on the
intuitionistic sequent calculus. The operational rules considered involve only
implication and disjunction. The inference rules will be presented linearly.
Capital latin letters A, B and C represent sentences of the propositional language. Small Latin letters a, b, c sentences belonging to At, the subset of atomic
sentences of . Capital Greek letters Γ and Δ represent finite multisets of
sentences of  (including the empty multiset).The fragment of propositional
logic LJM, contains the following structural rules:
Basic sequents:                A⊢A
Thinning on the left: Γ⊢A ⇒ Γ, B⊢A
Contraction on the left:       Γ, C, C, Δ⊢A ⇒ Γ, C, Δ⊢A
Cut:              (Γ⊢A and A, Δ⊢B) ⇒ Γ, Δ⊢B
LJM contains the following two operational rules for implication:
Implication introduction on the right: Γ, A⊢B ⇒ Γ⊢AB
Implication introduction on the left:   Γ⊢A and Δ, B⊢C ⇒ Γ, Δ, AB⊢C
LJM contains the following rules disjunction:
Disjunction introduction on the right: Γ⊢A ⇒ Γ⊢AB (L)
 Γ⊢B ⇒ Γ⊢AB (R)
Disjunction introduction on the left:   Γ, A⊢C and Δ, B⊢C ⇒ Γ, Δ, AB⊢C
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3. Kripke semantics for the fragments of LJM
A frame F in the intuitionistic Kripke semantics is an ordered pair <G, R>, where
G is a set (frequently interpreted as a set of possible worlds or states of
knowledge) and R is a partial order relation over the elements of G. A model M
for the LJM in Kripke semantics is given by a valuation over a frame F and
two clauses: one for implication and another for disjunction. We use small Greek
letters for elements of G. The valuation VM is such that for every element  of G
and every sentence of At: VM (, a) is either 0 (not forced) or 1 (forced). We also
write ⊩Ma when VM(,a)=1 and ⊮Ma when VM(,a)=0. Additionally, VM is
such that, if R and ⊩Ma, then ⊩Ma. It is clear from the above that for any
sentence aAt and any G: ⊩Ma or ⊮Ma.
The clause for implication is: 
⊩MAB ⇔ for all  such that R (⊩MA ⇒⊩MB);
Which gives us a semantics for LJM. The clause for disjunction is:
⊩M AB ⇔⊩M A or ⊩M B.
Which added to the previous one gives us a semantics for LJM.
Lemma 1 (monotonicity) – For every sentence A, if R and ⊩MA, then
⊩MA.
Proof: straightforward induction on the complexity of A. QED
4. The distinguished model DM
Let the Frame FPA be such that GPA is the set of finite parts of At, i.e. any GPA
is finite and   At. Let RPA be . The Distinguished Model (DM) is a model
over FP A whose valuation VDM is such that: for any GPA and any aAt,
⊩DMa⇔ a  . Starred small Greek letters will indicate either worlds of DM or
simply finite sets of atomic sentences. Obviously, any finite set is a finite
multiset.
As the empty world is an element of GPA the following are instantiations of
the clauses for DM:
⊩DMAB ⇔ for all * (*⊩DMA ⇒*⊩DMB) (DM.1)
*⊩DMAB ⇔*⊩DMA or *⊩DMB (DM.2)
Of course, because of lemma 1, any sentence valid in the empty world is also
valid for any world in DM. 
Question 1:⊩DM (a(bc))((ab)(ac)) for any three atomic sentences
a, band c? The answer is yes.
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meaning of implication: Γ⊢AB ⇔ Γ,A⊢B. Actually, Γ,A⊢B⇔ for all finite
ΔΓ (Δ⊢A ⇒ Δ⊢B). This is proved by using cut1. 
From our perspective the equivalence of theorem 1has to be taken as saying
that Kripke semantics is intensionally misleading because the implication clause
is misleading. As a particular case of the above theorem we have for the empty
world of DM:⊢AB ⇔ for all Δ (Δ⊢A⇒ Δ⊢B)2. While, of course, the
following implication:
(i) If for all finite Δ (Δ⊢A ⇒ Δ⊢B), then for all (finite) * (*⊢A ⇒*⊢B)
is correct, the converse implication:
(ii) if for all (finite) * (*⊢A ⇒*⊢B), then for all finite Δ (Δ⊢A ⇒ Δ⊢B) is
not correct. 
The sentence (iii) bellow is a particular case of (ii). Let, a, b and c be distinct
atomic sentences: 
( i i i ) i f f o r a l l * [*⊢a(bc )⇒*⊢(ab)(ac)] , then
a(bc)⊢a(bc) ⇒ a(bc)⊢(ab)(ac).
First, as * is a finite set of atomic sentences, the supposition that
*⊢a(bc) implies that there will be a cut-free derivation in which
*,a⊢bor*,a⊢c. Thus, *⊢(ab)(ac). Second, a(bc)⊢a(bc) is a
basic sequent. Finally, a(bc)⊢(ab)(ac) is not derivable in LJM with
an empty basis.
6. Conclusions
From the extensional point of view Kripke’s semantics and the intuitionistic
propositional logic are equivalent, also in the fragment for implication. But,
there is an important difference concerning the Distinguished Model. While the
syntactical system does not derive a(bc)⊢(ab)(ac), DM validates it.
Therefore, either we give preeminence to the syntactical system and reject the
semantical characterization as a way intensionally incorrect of capturing the
constructivist meaning of logical constants or we do the opposite. 
From an historical point of view, the syntactical system, that is, Heyting’s
calculus came first in the 30´s. As we said, Kripke’s semantic was published in
the 60’s.  But of course, the question is not of temporal precedence in
publication. It is a question of faithful representation. But then we should ask:
1Once cut is assumed, it can also be proved that Γ,AB⊢C⇔ for all finite ΔΓ (Δ,A⊢B⇒
Δ⊢C) from Γ⊢AB ⇔ for all finite ΔΓ (Δ⊢A ⇒ Δ⊢B), and vice-versa.
2 Clearly, it is enough to take into account merely finite sets.
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representation of what? Of the intuitionist position? Of a constructivist position
among others?
Kripke semantics has been rejected from a more purist point of view, like
Dummett’s in LBM p. 26, since for these purists the metalevel use of third
middle excluded for the relation of forcing would be truly unacceptable for a
constructivist. We think that such a criticism is wrong headed. After all, a
semantic must provide counter models, and in order to provide counter models
we must be able to say when a sentence is not forced in a world. Kripke could as
well just have laid down clauses for explaining when a sentence is not forced in
a world, thus making no use of third middle.
However, we are inclined to assume the calculus as the constructivist basic
standing point. The above sequent calculus takes into account a concept that has
not received all the attention deserved in the recent history of logic. This is the
concept of hypothesis. We do use hypotheses in our reasonings and the sequent
calculus somehow captures what is to use a hypothesis. Kripke semantics, on the
other hand, makes the notion of hypothesis dependent on the notion of state of
knowledge or of possible world. This is what is involved in the quantification in
Kripke’s implication clause. And the DM model has in a sense all possible
combinations of finite worlds. It is clear that the meta property of theorem 1
gives a criterion for introducing implication that is more restrictive. It requires
quantification over, at least, all finite sets of hypotheses, and not only the atomic
ones. These sets are defined by reference to a language and they do not require
any epistemically unclear and dubious concept like that of state of knowledge.
References
[Dum91]   DUMMETT, M., Logical Basis of Metaphysics, London: Duckworth, 1991.
[Fit69] FITTING, M., Intuitionistic Logic Model Theory and Forcing, North-Holland
Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1969.
[Kri65] KRIPKE, S. A., Semantical analysis of intuitionistic logic, in Studies in Logic
and Foundations of Mathematics, J. Crossley& M. Dummett (eds.), v. 40, pp 92–130,
Elsevier, 965: 92–130.
[Mos15] MOSCHOVAKIS, J., Intuitionistic logic, SEP, 2015.
[Pie15] PIECHA, T. & alli., Failure of completeness in proof-theoretic semantics,
Journal of Philosophical Logic 44, 321–335, 2015.
[San16] SANZ, W. & Oliveira, H., On Dummett’s verificationist justification 
procedure, Synthese 193 (8):2539-2559, 2016.
[Sch12] SCHRÖDER-HEISTER, P., Proof-theoretic semantics, SEP, 2012.
